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Abstract
This paper accounts for the value of children and future generations in the evaluation of health policies.
This is achieved through the incorporation of altruism and fertility in a “value of life” type of framework.
We are able to express adults’ willingness to pay for changes in child mortality and also to incorporate the
welfare of future generations in the evaluation of current policies. Our model clariﬁe sas e r i e so fp u z z l e s
from the literature on the “value of life” and on intergenerational welfare comparisons. We show that, by
incorporating altruism and fertility into the analysis, the estimated welfare gain from recent reductions in
mortality in the U.S. easily doubles.
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This paper accounts for the value of children and future generations in the evaluation of health
policies. This is achieved through the incorporation of altruism and fertility in a “value of life”
type of framework. We argue that altruism and fertility are natural ways to model the value that
parents attach to children, which is intrinsically related to the value that present generations attach
to the welfare of future generations. By bringing these new dimensions into the analysis, we are
able to express adults’ willingness to pay for changes in child mortality and also to incorporate the
welfare of future generations in the evaluation of current policies. This is done in a setting where
fertility, and therefore the size of future generations itself, is endogenous to current generations’
decisions. Our model clariﬁes a series of puzzles from the literature on the “value of life” and on
intergenerational welfare comparisons, ranging from the proﬁle of the “value of a statistical life”
over the life-cycle to the speciﬁc way in which individuals who have not yet been born−and whose
existence itself may depend on current actions−should be incorporated in cost-beneﬁt analyses.
An increasing body of literature has applied the “value of life” methodology to analyze diﬀerent
aspects of welfare gains from changes in mortality rates.1 These studies made important contri-
butions to the understanding and measurement of non-monetary aspects of human welfare. Yet
they suﬀer from an important methodological drawback: they do not incorporate in the analysis
altruism, fertility decisions, and their consequences in terms of welfare evaluation. Two interre-
lated dimensions of fertility choice are essential in evaluating life expectancy and health-related
welfare gains. First, child mortality rates−which would be irrelevant for the welfare of an adult
individual in an egoistic setup−can be very important in determining welfare in a context in
which individuals choose the number of children they have. Second, if altruism motivates fertility,
life expectancy gains have a twofold eﬀect: they directly increase utility via increased survival
probabilities, and they increase utility via the increased welfare of the oﬀspring.2
1 The main contributions to the theoretical literature were made by Schelling (1968), Usher (1973), Arthur
(1981), and Rosen (1988, 1994), among others. Nordhaus (2003), Murphy and Topel (2003), and Garrett (2001)
applied this methodology to analyze diﬀerent aspects of health-related gains in welfare in the United States through-
out the twentieth century. Philipson and Soares (2005) used this methodology to estimate the income value of the
welfare loss due to AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa, while Soares (2006) applied this methodology to estimate the wel-
fare cost of violence across diﬀerent regions of the world. Becker, Philipson, and Soares (2005) applied an adapted
version of the same technique to evaluate the evolution of welfare inequality across countries, once improvements in
life expectancy are accounted for. Becker and Elias (2006) use estimates from the “value of life” to infer how much
it would cost to increase suﬃciently the supply of organs for live transplants in order to eliminate any signiﬁcant
waiting time.
2 Cropper and Sussman (1988) and Rosen (1994) consider the problem of marginal willingness to pay for
reductions in mortality rates when individuals leave bequests to a single descendant. Under certain circumstances,
this may correspond to the incorporation of altruism. Some of the recent literature cited above tries to incorporate
future populations by extending discount or interest rates across diﬀerent generations. In general, intergenerational
discount is diﬀerent from time discount, so these should not be treated as being the same concept. One cannot
extrapolate what one individual does over the lifetime to diﬀerent individuals. In any case, none of these papers
1In this paper, we evaluate the welfare implicati o n so fm o r t a l i t yr e d u c t i o n si nas e t u pi nw h i c h
individuals choose the number of children they have and are altruistic toward their children. We
show that, under these circumstances, the value of adult mortality changes can be decomposed into
three factors: the consumption factor from the traditional “value of life” speciﬁcation, discussed in
Rosen (1988); a fertility factor, which accounts for the welfare improvements related to the higher
probability of having children; and an altruism factor, which accounts for the fact that mortality
reductions will also be enjoyed by all future generations. In addition, our approach allows us
to calculate an adult’s willingness to pay for reductions in child mortality. This willingness to
pay generally depends on the eﬀect of child mortality on the ﬁnal costs of child production,
the uncertainty regarding the number of surviving children, and the emotional loss associated
with the death of a child. As in the case of adult mortality, child mortality reductions are also
valued because future generations will beneﬁt from it. In fact, we show that, when parents
care for their children through altruistic links, any marginal willingness to pay approach that
adequately accounts for parents’ preferences will also account for the value of welfare gains to
future generations.
In order to illustrate the relevance of the new dimensions introduced by our theoretical frame-
work, we calibrate our model to U.S. data and calculate the value that the population alive in
1965 would attribute to the mortality reductions observed between 1965 and 1995. Our results
imply that the welfare gain for an 18-year-old individual is between 79% and 200% higher than
what would have been estimated if the welfare that young adults derive from their children was
ignored. The aggregate social value is between 27% and 80% higher. These diﬀerences are due to
beneﬁts from child mortality reductions that are enjoyed by young adults and that could not have
been estimated had we not incorporated altruism and fertility in the analysis. In addition, our
calibrated model generates as by-products some curious numbers, never before estimated in the
literature. For example, a function of parameters that can be roughly understood as the monetary
value of the emotional loss from the death of a child is estimated to be between $1.2 million and
$3.9 million.
Though applied to the analysis of changes in health, the paper touches on the more general
question of how to deal with children and future generations in the evaluation of policy interven-
tions. Since mortality risk at any age is a completely forward-looking measure, egoistic adults
who survive childhood place zero value on mortality changes at earlier ages. As a consequence, in
the standard framework, the contribution of changes in child mortality to the welfare of an adult
is null, since altruistic behavior toward oﬀspring is not taken into account. In reality, however,
include the choice of number of children together with the value that parents attach to children, and therefore
cannot be extended to adequately account for future generations.
2future generations cannot voice their concerns or reveal their preferences via market behavior, and
children, because of lack of maturity and dependence on parental care, are incapable of legally
deciding. For these same reasons, contractual arrangements involving children−or possibly unborn
individuals−cannot directly incorporate future beneﬁts in current evaluations of policy interven-
tions (see the discussion in Becker and Murphy, 1988). As an alternative, our model allows for
endogenous fertility and altruism in order to transfer the beneﬁts of certain policies across diﬀerent
generations. In our theory, as in reality, parents are the ones who decide and are liable for their
children.
Altruism in human societies is certainly not restricted to the immediate family or even to direct
descendants. Nevertheless, the case for incorporating parents’ altruism toward children in public
policy evaluation seems far stronger than any other.3 Not only does this approach incorporate
the preferences of a signiﬁcant share of the population that is not allowed to decide (children),
but it also establishes an intergenerational link that ultimately accounts for the beneﬁts accrued
by all future generations. In addition, the task of assigning values to welfare gains experienced by
children is transferred to those who are the children’s legal guardians and already decide for them
in all relevant dimensions of life, namely, the parents.
Several applications have stressed that the evaluation of policies aﬀecting children requires
knowledge of parental preferences, since children are not the actual decision-makers in most legal
and economic contexts (see, for example, Carlin and Sandy, 1991, Mount et al., 2000, Dickie and
Ulery, 2001, and Jenkins, Owens, and Wiggins, 2001). Endogenous fertility decisions have also
been suggested as a way to deal with evaluations of welfare involving future generations, since
exogenous fertility implies a series of puzzling considerations. Under exogenous fertility, an unre-
stricted number of births is always advocated because it increases the aggregate number of years
lived in society and, hence, social welfare. Also, changes in mortality immediately before or after
birth cannot be adequately taken into account, since there are almost no expenditures undertaken
by parents up to that point. As a consequence, there is no theoretical basis to determine how
unborn individuals should be treated (see Preston, 1993, Deaton, 2004, and Viscusi, 2005).4
3 Bergstrom (1982, 2006) and Jones-Lee (1992) study altruism within the family and its eﬀects on the value of
life, but with no considerations for costly fertility decisions. Bergstrom (1982) shows that “pure altruism” produces
no additional value for changes in health risks if altruistic concerns are dealt with in the ﬁrst order condition.
Jones-Lee (1992) provides several extensions and generalizations. The case of fertility poses diﬀerent problems
because, in a marriage, as studied for example in Bergstrom (2006), the utility functions of husband and wife are
well-deﬁned and the formation of a marriage is voluntary. Not only are children self-produced by parents, but
unborn children’s self-valuation is not observable nor contractable.
4 Valuations made by nineteenth-century courts after wrongful deaths of children were given in terms of replace-
ment of children’s lost wages but became unfounded when child labor was abolished (Zelizer, 1994). Valuations in
terms of parental investments in the upbringing of a child are also contradictory, especially for very young children,
because, as Zelizer (1994, p.135) notes, they “would lead to the awkward conclusion that the average child had a
negative worth and its death was a beneﬁtf o rp a r e n t s . ”
3Our framework shows that these puzzling considerations arise because altruism and fertility
decisions are absent from traditional models. Once altruism and fertility are incorporated in
the analysis−and an endogenous link between parents and children is established−the problems
disappear. Generally, the same principle explored here can be extended to any other policy
context in which government interventions have their costs or beneﬁts spread out through diﬀerent
generations.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 presents a simple
model illustrating the main implications of the incorporation of fertility and altruism into “value
of life” calculations. Section 3 develops the general version of the model, and derives a formula for
the social value of changes in survival functions. Section 4 illustrates the empirical relevance of our
approach by calculating the value of the mortality reductions experienced by the U.S. population
between 1965 and 1995. Section 5 concludes the paper with some general remarks.
2 A Simple Model of Fertility and the Value of Life
This section illustrates the consequences of altruism and endogenous fertility for the valuation of
life expectancy changes, and shows that they are intrinsically related to the value that parents
attach to children and future generations. We construct a simpliﬁed example, as close as possible
to the simplest model presented in Rosen (1988), in order to highlight the dimensions added to
the problem and to compare our results to the previous literature.
Consider individuals who live for three periods: childhood, young adulthood, and mature
adulthood. Individuals face a probability pc of surviving birth. If they survive birth, they become
young adults and face a probability pa of survival into mature adulthood. Decisions are made
at this stage, after individuals survive child mortality, and just before their adult mortality is
realized.5 If individuals survive into mature adulthood, their consumption and fertility plans are
carried out, and then their oﬀspring face the child mortality risk.
At time t, young adults receive an endowment wt. Young adults decide on consumption and
number of births before the event with probability pa is realized. Actuarially fair insurance is
available for every good consumed by parents, so that the budget constraint can be written as
5 Though this sequence of events may seem excessively artiﬁc i a l ,i tk e e p st h i n g sa ss i m p l ea sp o s s i b l e . T h e
interpretation of the diﬀerent stages becomes more natural in the generalized version of the model. For simplicity,
we also ignore general equilibrium eﬀects of changes in mortality and analyze an economy without production.
With the exception of Arthur (1981), all papers in this literature have ignored general equilibrium implications.
In Arthur (1981), however, all fertility decisions are exogenous. In our model, we address the economic value of
changes in health that are outside the control of any particular individual (as related to scientiﬁc and technological
developments in medical and biological sciences, for example). If households have control over some aspects of
mortality, endogenous mortality changes will have no eﬀect on welfare in addition to that reﬂe c t e do ne x p e n d i t u r e s .
4wt = pa[ct + ntb +( pcnt)e],( 1 )
where b is the goods cost of having a child and e is the goods cost of raising a surviving child. The
costs of having and raising children are assumed to be ﬁxed. To keep things simple and comparable
to the previous literature, we assume no margin in which parents can invest or transfer additional
resources to their children.6
Adults value consumption, the number of surviving children they have, and the utility that
each child will enjoy as an adult. Adults are responsible for all decisions in the economy. Figure
1 summarizes the sequence of events in this simple version of the model.




Child mortality realized 
(survival prob. pc) 
Individual becomes a young 
adult and makes consumption 
and fertility plans 
Adult mortality realized 
(survival prob. pa) 
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As in Rosen (1988), utility is assumed to be state-dependent in dimensions involving life and
death events. We assume that surviving individuals derive utility from consumption and children,
but that utility in case of death is equal to a constant Ma. Similarly, we assume that even though
parents derive utility only from surviving children, there is a state-dependent utility loss associated
with the death of a child. Therefore, the expected utility for a young adult satisﬁes the following
value function
e Vt =m a x
ct,nt
n
pa{e u(ct)+E[e v(nt,N t, e Vt+1)]} +( 1− pa)Ma
o
,
subject to the constraint (1), where ct is consumption by adults at time t, nt is the number
of children born, Nt is the number of surviving children, and e Vt+1 is the future utility that
the surviving children will enjoy as they become adults. The function e u(ct) denotes the utility
6 Note that our assumptions eliminate the traditional quantity-quality trade-oﬀ in terms of the analytical results
of the model. Parents could still value child quality as human capital if we make the value function depend on
human capital. Nevertheless, when the model is applied to data to evaluate diﬀerent situations, this trade-oﬀ will
be reﬂe c t e di nd i ﬀerent values of the parameters b and e, since in equilibrium these reﬂect the marginal value that
parents attach to children.
5derived from consumption, and e v(nt,N t,V t+1) denotes the overall utility derived from children,
including the enjoyment from the surviving children and their welfare, and the emotional loss
associated with children who are born but do not survive childhood (nt − Nt). Since there is an
additional dimension of uncertainty related to the survival of children (probability pc), parents
try to maximize e u(ct) plus the expected value of e v(nt,N t,V t+1), conditional on survival into
adulthood.
In addition, we assume that the utility derived from surviving children follows the usual for-
mulation from the fertility literature (as, for example, in Becker and Barro, 1988), so that the
utility derived from Nt surviving children is given by αN
φ
t Vt+1,w i t h0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. As mentioned
before, we also consider a state-dependent utility loss of αMc for each child born who does not
survive childhood. The utility loss associated with the death of (nt − Nt) children is given by
α(nt − Nt)Mc.I no u rs e t t i n g ,Mc will have the connotation of the utility value associated with
the loss of one child (regardless of family characteristics). This is a state-dependent formulation
in the event of death of a child, analogous to the approach adopted by Rosen (1988) in relation
to adult deaths. Finally, in order to simplify the analysis, we assume that there is no uncertainty
about child quality or, in other words, that the series {wi}∞
i=t is known. Therefore, there is no
uncertainty regarding the value of Vt+1 itself.
In this context, we can normalize adult utility in the death state to zero by deﬁning the
instantaneous utility function u(ct)=˜ u(ct) − Ma.B yd e ﬁning the value function Vt = e Vt − Ma,
we can specify a young adult’s objective function as





t Vt+1 − (nt − Nt)Mc]}
o
.
Note that there are two diﬀerent dimensions of uncertainty in the problem. One is related to
whether the individual will die before being able to realize the consumption and fertility plans,
while the other is related to the number of children who survive (Nt) out of the total number of
children born (nt). Since the value function is deﬁned as the expected utility of an adult individual,
the only remaining dimension of uncertainty after the individual survives adult mortality is related
to the number Nt of children who will survive out of nt births.
This problem is as close as possible to the one discussed in Rosen (1988, Section 1), once fertility
and altruism are incorporated in the analysis. Nevertheless, altruism and fertility introduce new,
nontrivial dimensions of uncertainty in the discussion. Since one of our main motivations is
to explore child mortality in a context of value of life calculations, we deal explicitly with the
uncertainty related to pc. Following Sah (1991), with constant pc, the number of surviving children



















since E(nt − Nt)=( 1− pc)nt and Vt+1 is known to parents.
As in Kalemli-Ozcan (2002), we approximate the function E[N
φ
t ] around the expected number
of survivors E[Nt] using the delta method. This strategy allows us to deal with fertility as a
continuous variable and still account for the eﬀects associated with the risk regarding the number
of surviving children via the explicit consideration of the second moment of the distribution. A
second order approximation to E[N
φ
t ] leads to
E[N
φ
t ] ≈ (pcnt)
φ −




since E[Nt − (pcnt)] = 0 and the variance for the binomial distribution satisﬁes E[Nt − (pcnt)]
2 =
ntpc(1 − pc). Using this result, the individual problem becomes







φ(1 − φ)(1 − pc)(pcnt)φ−1
2
¸




The ﬁrst order conditions determining the optimal consumption and fertility decisions are








Vt+1 − Mc(1 − pc)
)
= pa(b + epc)λt,






φ(1 − φ)2(1 − pc)(pcnt)φ−2pc
2
.
7Changes in Adult Survival
The value of changes in life expectancy can be expressed as the marginal willingness to pay for








This marginal willingness to pay can be interpreted as the monetary value of the marginal
utility from increased survival probability, or, alternatively, as the marginal rate of substitution
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where εc and εn denote the elasticities of the consumption and fertility sub-utility functions in
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Equation (5) can be immediately compared to the results from the original value of life lit-
erature. It highlights the insights gained by incorporating fertility and altruism in the analysis.
Without fertility decisions and altruism, (5) would be reduced to (ε−1
c − 1)c,w h i c hi se x a c t l y
the result presented in Rosen (1988, 287). This result summarizes the fact that increases in life
expectancy will be more valuable for higher levels of consumption and for a lower elasticity of
the sub-utility function u(c). However, because higher survival probabilities increase the cost of
the actuarially fair insurance, reductions in mortality lower consumption in case of survival. This
is precisely the sense in which Rosen (1994) identiﬁes a trade-oﬀ between the quantity and the
quality of life.
8The second term inside brackets represents an analogous eﬀect in relation to fertility, coming
from the fact that increased survival probability increases the likelihood that individuals will live
long enough to realize their fertility plans and derive utility from their children. The term (b+epc)
converts the value of fertility into monetary (consumption) units, while the rest of the expression
is completely analogous to the case of consumption. The new expression states that increases in
life expectancy will be more valuable in high fertility societies and for low values of the elasticity
of the fertility sub-utility in relation to its argument. Again, this last eﬀect derives from the fact
that increases in survival probabilities increase the cost of survivors, therefore reducing fertility
in case of survival.
Finally, the term outside brackets adjusts the value of life for the fact that not only will these
changes aﬀect the current generation, but they will also beneﬁt all future generations. MWPa
accounts for the present discounted value of the welfare gains: [(ε−1
c − 1)c +( b + epc)(ε−1
n − 1)n]
per generation, discounted at a rate paαE[Nφ].7 In order to write the present value of welfare
gains for all future generations in an expression ass i m p l ea st h eo n ea b o v e ,w ea s s u m eas t a t i o n a r y
environment.
Our methodology therefore evaluates the welfare gain from certain changes in mortality rates
if current conditions were maintained indeﬁnitely into the future. In other words, our framework
tells us what the value of certain life expectancy improvements would be in a stationary world
where the conditions observed in the data persisted forever. To the extent that economies display
long-run growth, it will underestimate the true welfare improvements brought about by reductions
in mortality rates. Even with these limitations, our setup extends the analysis in a direction that
was entirely ignored by the previous literature.
The results discussed in this section neatly illustrate the features incorporated in the valua-
tion of adult mortality changes once fertility and altruism are taken into account. Apart from
the usual eﬀects, a permanent decline in adult mortality beneﬁts current and future generations
due to altruistic links, and to the higher probability that adults will live long enough to have
children. In reality, the establishment of an altruistic link between parents and children ends
up incorporating the welfare gains of all future generations. In our framework, the weight at-
tributed to these future generations is directly related to the value that current adults−the actual
decision-makers−attribute to their own children.
In addition to these gains, there are important aspects of changes in child mortality and their
7 For this to be the case, we must have paαE
£
Nφ¤
< 1, which is precisely the condition required for the recursive
problem described before to be well deﬁned. Note also that the homogeneity of the value function, characteristic
of the deterministic version of Becker and Barro (1988), fails to hold in the presence of child mortality under our
state-dependent forumlation. Our assumption of zero income growth allows us to obtain a closed form solution for
the problem even in the absence of homogeneity.
9interactions with fertility that are distinct in nature from the eﬀects of changes in adult mortality.
We now explore these implications within the framework of our model.
Changes in Child Survival
We deﬁne MWPc as the marginal willingness to pay of adults for increases in pc.A sw es t a t e d
before, parents, not children, express their concern for survival and their willingness to pay for





















































Va r(N)/E[N] as the coeﬃcient of variation.















The term transforming the ﬂow of welfare into its present discounted value multiplies the
expression as in the marginal willingness to pay for changes in adult survival rates. Changes in
child mortality are assumed to be permanent, and, therefore, they will be enjoyed not only by this
generation but also by all future generations.
In the case of child mortality, three elements compose the valuation of mortality changes for
any given generation (the expression multiplying the discount factor). The ﬁrst term inside square
brackets (bn) represents savings for households due to lower costs in the acquisition of survivors,
while the second term derives exclusively from uncertainty considerations. The last term represents
the increased welfare from the reduced probability of death of a child (αMc per child monetized
by uc(c)).
Three extreme examples help clarify the economic forces at work here. First, with risk neu-
trality (φ =1 ), the second term inside brackets disappears. In this case, the goods cost per child
born and the utility cost per child dead determine the marginal willingness to pay for reductions
10in child mortality. Risk neutrality in this context can also be interpreted as perfect replacement
in fertility, since parents have no incentive for fertility insurance or hoarding motives. One can
think of it as if children could be replaced immediately after they died, and there was no need to
decide on the number of children before child mortality was realized.8
Second, consider the other extreme when 0 <φ<1 and b = Mc =0 .H e r e , t h e g o o d s
cost of children is deﬁned only for survivors, and there is no welfare loss due to the death of a
child. Hence, the value of changes in child mortality depends only on the risk premium due to
uncertainty. In this case, even without additional economic costs, reductions in child mortality
may improve welfare since increased chances of child survival reduce parents’ uncertainty.
Finally, if we have φ =1 , still with Mc = b =0 , there are no gains from reductions in child
mortality. In this situation, the number of births adjusts on a one-to-one basis to changes in child
mortality, and all costs of children are deﬁned in terms of survivors. As parents are risk neutral
and there is no cost wedge between children born and surviving children, parents have a target
number of expected survivors that is maintained irrespective of the child mortality rate.
In summary, two elements compose the valuation of reductions in child mortality: costs of non-
surviving children (both monetary and utility losses) and reductions in the uncertainty associated
with surviving children. These gains are diﬀerent in nature from the traditional valuations in
Arthur (1981) and Rosen (1988), and deserve particular attention in an attempt to attach social
values to health improvements. In our setup, the willingness to pay for changes in child mortality
is not expressed by the individuals who are subject to the mortality risk, since these individuals
(children) are not legal decision-makers and, in some circumstances, have not yet been born. This
is precisely why a framework that adequately accounts for the value of changes in child mortality
must incorporate fertility as a choice variable, and must express welfare through the perspective
of parents and their altruism toward children.
3 General Model
This section generalizes the model presented before. Our goal is to obtain expressions that allow
the valuation of speciﬁc mortality changes for an adult individual at any given age. With that in
hand, the model can be used to determine the social value of any change in survival probabilities.
As will be clear below, a critical variable for the calculation of the social value of mortality
changes is the value of these changes for an individual entering adulthood. Therefore, we start by
8 Estimates of the extent of behavioral replacement eﬀects are often below one with point estimates near or
below one-half. That is, additional births do not completely replace child deaths in the family. See Wolpin (1997,
Section 2.5) for a survey of empirical results.









T+1 − (1 − pc)nTMc},( 7 )
where S(t,a) is the discounted survivor function, or the function describing the probability that
the agent survives from ages a to t, discounted at the rate of time preference.9 At age a,
individuals decide their proﬁle of consumption throughout life, and at age τ>a , parents realize
their fertility plans. All children are assumed to be born at the same time τ. V a
T+1 reﬂects the
children’s utility once they reach adulthood at age a. Since the value function refers to diﬀerent
generations, T indexes generations and t indexes ages. NT represents the number of children
surviving to age a o u to fat o t a ln u m b e ro fb i r t h snT, from parents belonging to generation T.
The diﬀerence between survivors and births corresponds to the eﬀects of mortality on children.
For the sake of simplicity, we abstract from the dynamic nature of the child-rearing process.
In line with the formulation of the previous section, we assume that children are born, face all
the risks related to child and pre-adult mortality at one single moment, and immediately become
adults. In terms of the undiscounted survival function S∗(t,i), we only consider the ﬁnal survival
probability between ages 0 and a, pc = S∗(a,0),w h e r e ,a sb e f o r e ,pc represents the total survival
probability for children. We revisit this issue when calibrating the model (see Section 4).
As in the previous section, we consider explicitly the role of uncertainty and assume that
the number of surviving children behaves as a random variable with binomial distribution (see
equation (3)). The rest of the model remains unchanged: parents have access to an actuarially fair
insurance for every good they consume, and they pay a ﬁxed cost per child born and an additional
cost per child reaching adulthood. Therefore, for a given endowment WT received by a member




c(t)S(t,a)dt + S(τ,a)(bnT + e[pcnT]),( 8 )
where the interest rate is assumed to be equal to the subjective discount rate.
This formulation keeps the basic features discussed before, but adds a couple of new dimensions
in terms of the impact of adult mortality reductions across diﬀerent age groups. For example,
adult mortality reductions taking place before fertility decisions are realized (τ) have now qual-
itatively diﬀerent impacts from mortality reductions taking place after that. Or, alternatively,
9 If S∗(t,a) is the survival function, the discounted survival function is given by S(t,a)=e−ρ(t−a)S∗(t,a),
where ρ is the subjective discount rate. Strictly, consumption should also be indexed by generation, as in cT(t),
indicating the consumption of generation T at age t. We use the discounted survival function and write c(t) to save
on notation.
12adult mortality changes related to ages below that of parents, which therefore do not aﬀect their
personal survival, may still aﬀect their welfare through intergenerational links.
First order conditions in this case are almost identical to those discussed in the simpler version
of the model. To evaluate changes in mortality in this context, we think of shifts in the survival
function as caused by changes in some underlying parameter θ. In this sense, we deﬁne Sθ(t,i)=
∂S(t,i;θ)/∂θ as the change in the conditional discounted probability of survival from age i to age
t brought about by a change in θ.
3.1 The Problem of an Individual Entering Adulthood
Changes in Adult Survival
We start with the problem of an individual entering adulthood, at age a. As we mentioned
before, this individual will be key in allowing for the valuation of mortality changes for individuals
in any age group. We label the willingness to pay of generation T at age a for changes in adult
survival as MWPA
a . As before, we express the value of changes in life expectancy as the marginal










Using the envelope theorem and the ﬁrst order conditions the same way as we did before,
we arrive at a similar expression for MWPA
a . In a stationary environment, we have ∂VT/∂θ =
























When mortality reductions aﬀect survival probabilities before age τ, individuals also beneﬁt
directly from the increased probability of living long enough to have children. Since individuals
are altruistic, they are willing to pay to ensure new generations through the realization of fertility
decisions. This same force is not present when changes in mortality only aﬀect survival rates after
age τ.
Changes in Child Survival
The case of changes in child survival is completely analogous to the simpler version of the model.
We deﬁne MWPC
a as the marginal willingness to pay of an adult at age a for increases in pc.U s i n g
13the envelope theorem and the ﬁrst order conditions, and looking at a stationary environment, we


















The interpretation of the diﬀerent terms in the equation above was already discussed in Section
2.
3.2 The Problem of a Young Adult
To apply the model to heterogeneous populations, we have to extend it to deal with the problem
of adult individuals at diﬀerent ages. We deﬁne young adults as individuals who have not yet
acted on their fertility choices. For these individuals at age i,w h e r ea 6 i<τ ,t h eq u e s t i o n s
involved are similar to the ones discussed in Section 3.1, but for one small detail. Since individuals
will not necessarily be at age a, we will not be able to isolate ∂V a
T /∂θ on the left hand-side in
order to obtain a simple expression for the marginal willingness to pay, as we did before. This is
exactly why MWPC
a and MWPA
a play such critical roles. We can use the results from Section
3.1 to overcome this problem and value changes in mortality at any age between a and τ.
Changes in Adult Survival
We deﬁne the marginal willingness to pay of an individual at age i for changes in adult survival




































But note that the marginal willingness to pay refers to an individual at age i, while the
derivative of the value function in the right-hand side refers to an individual at age a. Therefore,
we cannot transfer the derivative of the value function to the left hand-side in order to obtain
the present discounted value of changes in mortality for all future generations. However, given
our results from the previous section, this is not necessary. Since the solution to the individual
problem of a young adult is time consistent, the multiplier on the budget constraint will always
have the same value in a stationary environment, irrespective of generation or age (this can be
seen from the ﬁrst order conditions and the budget constraint). In a stationary environment, this
means that the marginal utility of wealth (or the multiplier) will be constant within and across






















































As this expression makes clear, MWPA
a , or the marginal willingness to pay of an individual
at age a, is a key concept in the problem. Our willingness to pay measure allows the valuation
of future generations to be incorporated via the altruism of parents. In this case, the willingness
to pay of parents at age i is composed, as before, by the consumption and fertility factors, plus
the discounted value of these gains for their children. In turn, children will become adults when
their parents are τ years old. The meaning of this expression is exactly the same as equation (9),
the only diﬀerence being that parents’ marginal willingness to pay will not be exactly the same as
their children’s. Therefore, it is not possible to express MWPA
i directly as the simple discounted
value of the sum of the consumption and fertility factors.
Changes in Child Survival
For changes in θ that aﬀect child mortality, the result is also analogous to the expression for
a young adult at age a.W e d e ﬁne the marginal willingness to pay of an individual at age i for
























































This expression has the same interpretation as equation (10). The only diﬀerence is that
altruism for future generations is expressed via the discounted value of the marginal willingness to
pay of individuals entering adulthood (MWPC
a ), and not of individuals at the same age as their
parents.
153.3 The Problem of an Old Adult
For those individuals at age i>τ , fertility decisions have already been realized. As mentioned
before, we assume that these individuals cease to be altruistic toward their oﬀspring. A normative
interpretation of this hypothesis, mentioned in the introduction, is that the inclusion of forms
of altruism not related to the parent-children relationship is less justiﬁable, and not nearly as
important, as the inclusion of the altruism of parents toward young children. The altruism of
older parents toward their 40-year-old sons and daughters does not seem too diﬀerent from the
altruism of friends toward each other. Few would argue that the latter should be taken too
seriously or, in any case, that it would have any major eﬀect in welfare analysis (but see the
important discussion in Bergstrom, 2006).
With the hypothesis of egoistic old adults, the problem of an individual at age i>τturns
into the classical problem of the value of life literature, without altruism and without fertility.
If mortality reductions take place in age groups that do not directly beneﬁt the individual, the
marginal willingness to pay is zero. If mortality reductions take place at some age after i,w ea r e
back to the traditional value of life setup. We deﬁne the marginal willingness to pay of an old
adult for changes in θ as MWPO











This corresponds to what we called before the consumption factor. It represents the goods
trade-oﬀ between quantity and quality of life identiﬁed by Rosen (1994).10
3.4 Social Value of Mortality Reductions
With the previous results in hand, we are able to determine the social value of any given change in
the survival function. The social value will be a function of the age distribution of the population,
and of the valuation attached to the changes by each speciﬁc age group. The valuation of each age
group will ultimately depend on the moment and extent of the observed reductions in mortality.
Suppose that a population of P individuals is distributed across ages according to the distri-
bution function F(·). The social value of a given change in mortality rates, brought about by a
shift in the parameter θ,i sg i v e nb y
10 Though certainly extreme and concentrated at one point in time, the distinction between young and old adults
captures the idea that the value that parents place on a child’s life is reduced as the child ages. This pattern has
been noticed in the empirical literature (Jenkins, Owens, and Wiggins, 2001).





















i ,i fi 6 τ and
MWPO
i ,i fi>τ
we can write it in a simpler form




The social value is simply the weighted sum of the value of mortality changes across the
diﬀerent age groups, where the weights are given by the number of individuals in the population
that belong to each speciﬁcg r o u p( PdF(i)). It is immediate to see that the age distribution may
have a signiﬁcant impact on the social value of a speciﬁc change in survival probabilities. A society
with a high proportion of old individuals will value reductions in child or young adult mortalities
less, and value extensions in old age life expectancy more.
Also notice that our aggregate willingness to pay only incorporates individuals at age a or
older. From a policy perspective, these are the actual decision-makers and the individuals who
incur the costs of child raising. Legally, they are the ones who are allowed to decide and who can
interfere directly in the political process. Children and future generations only enter the social
willingness to pay via the altruism of current adults. This structure captures in a stylized way
the actual process of political decision observed in modern societies.
In reality, equation (13) is analogous to the characterization of the optimal provision of a public
g o o dc o m m o ni nt h ep u b l i cﬁnance literature. Equation (13) gives the maximum amount of taxes
that should be raised on the current population in order to promote a given reduction in mortality
rates (a change in θ). The key diﬀerence here is that our measure of social willingness to pay
incorporates the gains of children and future generations. These are considered to the extent that
current adults−due to the links established by intergenerational altruism−are willing to pay for
the welfare gains of their descendents. Indeed, equation (13) characterizes the optimal allocation
from the perspective of the costs and beneﬁts faced by the population currently alive.11
11 This is very diﬀerent from the approach taken by Murphy and Topel (2003) or Soares (2006). Murphy
and Topel (2003) and Soares (2006) incorporate future generations by simply extrapolating current numbers and
discounting future populations at the interest rate. This amounts to assuming a speciﬁct y p eo fi n t e r g e n e r a t i o n a l
welfare function that, as every other welfare function, is arbitrary. For example, given the preferences they assume,
their numbers would not be supported by voters as policy benchmarks for the beneﬁts of improvements in health.
174 Parametrization and Empirical Implications
4.1 Calibration
In order to illustrate the importance of the dimensions added by our framework, we use the model
developed in the previous section to give monetary values to the mortality reductions experienced
by the United States population between 1965 and 1995. Though part of the improvements in
health during this period were endogenous to changes in habits and income, our goal is simply to
use this example to show how important fertility and altruism can be in assessing the economic
value of reductions in mortality. This is a case that has been studied in the literature and, therefore,
constitutes a good initial example. In addition, the United States is one of few countries for which
alternative estimates of the “values of a statistical life” for both adults and children are currently
available.12
We look at the problem from the perspective of individuals alive in 1965, and ask how much
they would be willing to pay for the gains in survival probabilities that actually took place in
the following 30 years. As discussed previously, the numbers generated by the methodology
assume that individuals consider the economic conditions prevalent in 1965 as the ones that would
persist indeﬁnitely into the future. As the marginal willingness to pay increases with income, the
perspective of economic growth would increase the value of mortality reductions and even more
so for future generations. So, as with many other dimensions of our empirical strategy, this
assumption tends to reduce both the value of life expectancy gains and the relative importance of
altruism and fertility. As a general rule, whenever faced with choices regarding the implementation
of our methodology, we choose to proceed with the option that minimizes the importance of the
very factors we want to highlight. In this manner, we hope to guarantee that any remaining bias
will work against the relevance of our main points. To proceed, we need values for a series of
parameters and variables determining initial conditions (c, nT, b, e, φ, α, and the interest rate),
the survival function (S∗(t,a)), and the change in the survival function between 1965 and 1995
(S∗
θ(t,a)).
The U.S. survival functions for 1965 and 1995 are calculated from age-speciﬁcn u m b e ro f
deaths and population, obtained from the World Health Organization Mortality Database. The
WHO database contains information broken down by 5-year age intervals, so we assume constant
mortality rates within each interval. We calculate the 1965 numbers as averages for the period
between 1960 and 1969, and the 1995 numbers as averages between 1990 and 1999. Figure 1
12 The changes observed during the period are quite substantial. But, given the complexity of the problem
at hand, closed form solutions cannot be obtained for the valuation of discrete changes in survival probabilities.
Therefore, we stick to the formulas derived before for the marginal willingness to pay, and see our results as
approximations of the true welfare value of mortality reductions.
18illustrates the shift in the (undiscounted) survival function for the U.S. population between 1965
and 1995. This shift corresponds to a change in overall life expectancy at birth from 70 to 76 years.
Note that the U.S. experienced relatively modest gains in child mortality during this period, mainly
because of the already extremely low starting point (mortality before age 5 went from 2.84% to
0.99%). Also, the age distribution of the American population in 1965 had a relatively high share
of old adults when compared to young adults (36% of the population above age 40). If anything,
the example chosen tends to minimize the importance of altruism, fertility, and future generations
in the calculation of the social value of mortality reductions.






















Of the parameters and variables needed, some are common in the “value of life” literature.
First, interest rates are assumed to be 3% per year, and this number is used to calculate the
discounted survival functions (S(t,a)) .T h ea s s u m p t i o no fs u b j e c t i v er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ee q u a l
to the interest rate implies constant consumption throughout life. Since we are not interested in
life-cycle considerations, and this facilitates the empirical implementation of the model, it is the









Sθ(t,i)dt. Consumption is set to the 1965 value of total per capita
consumption ($13,835, equal to private plus government consumption in 1996 US$), obtained
from the Federal Reserve Board Economic Database (FED).13 Following Becker, Philipson, and
13 Murphy and Topel (2003) incorporate leisure in the analysis and obtain a measure of full-income. Therefore,
19Soares (2005), we assume that the instantaneous utility function for consumption takes the form
u(c)=ϕ + cσ/σ, which already incorporates the normalization of utility of death to zero (as in
the formulation proposed by Rosen, 1988). We also stick to the calibration proposed by these
authors, where ϕ = −16.16 and σ =0 .2.
For fertility (nT), the survival probability of children (pc), and the discounted survival prob-
ability of adults up to the age when fertility is realized (S(τ,a)), we use the 1965 values of,
respectively, the total fertility rate (2.9, or nT =1 .45, from the World Development Indica-
tors, WDI), the survival probability between ages zero and 18 (0.96), and the discounted survival
probability between ages 18 and 40 (0.50). We take pc to be the survival probability from zero
to eighteen because 18 years of age seem to be the natural benchmark for legal independence of
children. Besides, this timing matches well the data on the costs of raising children, which will
be used to calibrate some of the remaining parameters. In relation to the age when fertility is
realized, we choose τ =4 0 . Since we are consolidating the entire child-rearing process in a single
moment, we choose the middle point of the parenthood process as such moment. If one thinks
that parents usually start having children when they are between 25 and 30, and take care of
children in one way or another until they are roughly 50 or 55, the middle point would be around
age 40.
Estimates of the costs of raising a child (b and e) can be obtained from surveys of expenditures
on children, such as the ones undertaken by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Lino
(2001) presents the 1960 estimates of the USDA for the average costs of raising a child up to age
18, in 2000 US$. We use the CPI to deﬂate this value to 1996 US$. The USDA estimates imply
that roughly 5% of the expenditures on children takes place before age 2, while 95% takes place
between ages 2 and 18. We assume that costs up to age 2 are related to the costs of having a child
(b), and costs between ages 2 and 18 are related to costs of raising a surviving child (e). This
yields b =$ 6 ,956 and e = $126,812. Again, if anything, these estimates seem to underestimate
the value of b in comparison to e, and this will tend to minimize the importance of child mortality
in welfare evaluations.
The remaining parameters needed—α, φ,a n dMc—are uncommon in applied work and, as far as
we understand, have never been directly estimated in the literature. Therefore, some exploratory
calibration eﬀort is required, involving a subtler type of information that is not so widely available.
Calibration of these parameters requires knowledge of how much individuals value their own
survival probabilities vis-à-vis their children’s. There is a small empirical literature, based on
their numbers are larger than the ones obtained here. Murphy and Topel (2003) also deal explicitly with the issue
of life-cycle changes in earnings and consumption. To keep things simple and to focus on the points of interest, we
abstract from these considerations.
20interpersonal willingness to pay for changes in mortality, that addresses this type of question.
Cropper, Aydede, and Portney (1992), for example, use a survey to estimate the rate at
which people implicitly discount future lives saved. But their questions do not imply any kind of
personal relationship among the individuals being considered and, therefore, are not adequate for
our analysis. Carlin and Sandy (1991) use car safety seat information to estimate the “value of a
statistical life” of children to their mothers, but do not present comparable numbers for adults.
Dickie and Ulery (2001) use a contingent valuation survey to estimate parents’ willingness to pay
for various health conditions aﬀecting themselves and their children. These authors ﬁnd that
parents are willing to pay more for their children’s health than for their own (willingness to pay
to avoid acute illnesses), but do not address directly the issue of mortality.
Three papers use information on adult decisions to estimate the “values of a statistical life” for
both adults and children, and therefore contain the ideal type of information needed to calibrate
our parameters of interest. Blomquist, Miller, and Levy (1996) use a set of diﬀerent types of
data (seat-belt use, child safety-seat use, and motorcycle helmet use) and obtain a wide range of
estimates for adults and children. Their preferred estimate for the “value of a statistical life” for
adults is $2 million, while the average estimate for children is around $4 million.
Mount et al. (2000) calculate “values of a statistical life” based on cars owned by diﬀerent types
of families (single or with children) and the safety features of the cars. From the speciﬁcations
presented by the authors, our preferred value is the one that controls for diﬀerences in family
income, leading to “values of a statistical life” of $2.62 million for children and $3.88 million for
adults.
Finally, Jenkins, Owens, and Wiggins (2001) make use of data from purchases of bicycle
helmets, which are available speciﬁcally for people at diﬀerent age ranges and protect one particular
individual within the family. From the estimates presented by the authors, our preferred value
is the one that assumes that helmets are worn less than 100% of the time and that only half
of the beneﬁt comes from mortality reductions (the rest being attributed to morbidity). This
speciﬁcation leads to “values of a statistical life” of $1.3 million for children and $2 million for
adults.
Blomquist, Miller, and Levy (1996), Mount et al. (2000), and Jenkins, Owens, and Wiggins
(2001) estimate the “values of a statistical life” for children and adults separately, based on costs
and safety features associated with the use of seat belts, child safety seats, automobiles, and
helmets. These reﬂect values implicit in decisions taken by adults, matching well our theoretical
formalization.
From the theoretical perspective, the “value of a statistical life” can be conceptualized as the
21marginal willingness to pay for a one-shot unit change in the probability of death at some speciﬁc
age (as in Murphy and Topel, 2003). Therefore, from equations 9 and 10, a given set of estimates
of the “values of a statistical life” for adults and children deﬁnes−together with the variables
discussed before−two non-linear equations on three unknown parameters (α, φ,a n dMc). The
ﬁrst order conditions for ct and nT c a nb eu s e dt od e ﬁne a third equation, which, together with
the previous two, deﬁnes a system of three equations on three unknowns.
Table 1: Benchmark Variables for Base Year (1965) and for Calibration (1995)
Variable Deﬁnition Source 1965 1995
pc Survival probability to age 18 WHO 0.96 0.98
S(τ,a) Discounted survival prob. from age 18 to 40 WHO 0.50 0.51
c Consumption per capita FED 13,835 24,640
nT Fertility rate per parent WDI 1.47 1.02
b Child cost before age 2 USDA 6,956 7,847
e Child cost from age 2 to 18 USDA 126,812 143,052
Note: Values of c, b, and e in 1996 $. Sources and construction of variables described in detail in the
text. Values in 1995 used to calibrate α, φ,a n dMc; values in 1965 used as benchmark to calculate the
monetary value of the reductions in mortality observed between 1965 and 1995.
Table 2: Estimates of α, φ and Mc Based on the “Value of a Statistical Life” (VSL) for Adults
and Children
Source of VSL VSL (Mill., 1996 $): Calibrated Values
Children Adults αφ M c
Blomquist et al. (1996) 4.00 2.00 0.0612 0.5753 19,563
Mount et al. (2000) 2.62 3.88 0.0461 0.4755 16,858
Jenkins et al. (2001) 1.30 2.00 0.0339 0.3870 11,094
Note: Calibrated values from authors’ calculations using the “values of a statistical life” estimated by
Blomquist et al. (1996), Mount et al. (2000), and Jenkins et al. (2001). Calculations based on the three
equations described in the Appendix and the values of variables in 1995 presented in Table 1.
Since the studies discussed use data from the 1990’s, we set the other variables to their 1995
values in order to solve the system of non-linear equations for α, φ,a n dMc. The Appendix
presents the system of three non-linear equations and discusses in detail how this calibration was
conducted. For each set of estimates of the “values of a statistical life” for adults and children,
we obtain a set of estimates of α, φ,a n dMc. Table 1 presents the values of the variables used
22in the calibration of the parameters and in the calculation of the monetary value of the mortality
reductions observed between 1965 and 1995. The calibrated values of α, φ,a n dMc are shown in
Table 2.
In order to give a concrete meaning to the set of parameters presented in Table 2, we can
multiply α by Mc and divide this product by the marginal utility of consumption in order to get,
roughly speaking, the monetary value of the emotional loss associated with the death of a child.
The set of parameters calibrated imply that this value is between $1.2 million and $3.9 million.
This is at least one order of magnitude greater than the utility that parents derive from actually
having a child, which, from the ﬁrst order conditions, must be closely related to its marginal
cost (the utility from having a child can be expressed, in monetary terms, as αVt+1/uc(c),w h i c h
revolves around $100,000 in the speciﬁcations). According to any of the calibrated versions of the
model, the utility loss associated with the death of an existing child is orders of magnitude greater
than the utility gain from having an additional child.
4.2 Results
Table 3 presents the results. It contains the monetary value of child and adult mortality reductions
for an individual entering adulthood (age 18) and for the entire American population, according
to the diﬀerent sets of parameters. The table shows that any set of parameters yields a signiﬁcant
eﬀect of changes in child mortality on the welfare of a young adult. The results imply that an
18-year-old individual in 1965 would be willing to pay between $12,701 and $39,780 for the changes
in child mortality observed in the following 30 years, and between $16,167 and $20,191 for the
changes in adult mortality observed in the same period. Reﬂecting the diﬀerences in the “values
of a statistical life” used in the calibration, the diﬀerent sets of parameters lead to diﬀerences in
the relative importance of reductions in child and adult mortalities. But, in any case, all sets of
estimates lead to welfare gains from reductions in child mortality that are of the same order of
magnitude as those from reductions in adult mortality. With the Jenkins, Owens, and Wiggins
(2001) numbers, the total welfare gain is 79% higher than what would be estimated by looking at
reductions in adult mortality alone, while this diﬀerence jumps to 128% in the calibration based
on Mount et al. (2000), and 200% in the calibration based on Blomquist, Miller, and Levy (1996).
These are beneﬁts from child mortality reductions that are enjoyed by young adults and that could
not be estimated had we not incorporated altruism and fertility in the analysis.
When we move to the analysis of the social value of mortality changes, the relative importance
of child mortality is somewhat reduced, since a large fraction of the 1965 population was composed
of old adults who had already surpassed the assumed child-rearing age (τ =4 0 ). Still, Table 3
23shows that the social value estimated by our methodology is between 27% and 80% higher than
what would be obtained if we looked at adult mortality alone. In terms of values, the results imply
that the gains in life expectancy experienced in this 30-year period had a social value between $5
trillion and $7 trillion. These values correspond to at least 1.7 times the U.S. aggregate GDP in
1965. From this, between $1 trillion and $3 trillion come directly from the eﬀects of reductions in
child mortality, through altruism and fertility, on the welfare of adults.




18 Social MWPC Social MWPA
(1996 $) (1996 $) (Bill., 1996 $) (Bill., 1996 $)
Blomquist et al. (1996) 39,780 20,024 3,194 3,988
Mount et al. (2000) 25,787 20,191 2,071 3,986
Jenkins et al. (2001) 12,701 16,167 1,020 3,798
Note: Authors’ calculations based on parameter values presented in Table 2, benchmark variables from
1965 presented in Table 1, and the model discussed in the previous section.
Surprisingly, the diﬀerent sets of parameters lead to reasonably similar magnitudes of the
marginal willingness to pay of individuals and of society as a whole. The fact that the diﬀerent
calibrations of α, φ,a n dMc are based on evidence from very diﬀerent settings suggests that our
strategy is eﬀective in identifying the relevant underlying parameters.
Finally, though the results are quantitatively large and point to the relevance of altruism and
fertility in value of life-type calculations, we must repeat that several dimensions of our empirical
implementation tend to underestimate the very factors that we are trying to highlight. Indeed,
we see the evidence as an extremely strong case in favor of the incorporation of fertility and
altruism into the analysis. The assumption that individuals above 40 years have no altruistic
concerns toward future generations, the speciﬁc example picked (U.S.), and the assumption of no
economic growth tend to reduce the relative importance of fertility and altruism. Still, with sets
of parameters obtained from very diﬀerent contexts, we arrive at similar conclusions regarding the
relevance of these dimensions when evaluating the welfare impact of mortality reductions.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper develops and applies an extended version of the “value of life” methodology that
incorporates altruism and fertility decisions. In doing so, we are able to account for the value
24that parents attribute to reductions in child mortality and to incorporate the welfare of future
generations in the evaluation of current health policies. We show that, under these circumstances,
the value of adult mortality changes can be decomposed into three factors: the consumption factor
from the traditional value of life speciﬁcation; a fertility factor, which accounts for the welfare
improvements related to the higher probability of having children; and an altruism factor, which
accounts for the fact that mortality reductions will also be enjoyed by all future generations.
The value of changes in child mortality, on its turn, depends on the eﬀect of child mortality
reductions on the ﬁnal costs of child production, on the uncertainty regarding the number of
surviving children, and on the emotional loss associated with the death of a child. As with adult
mortality, child mortality reductions are also valuable because they are experienced by all future
generations.
Applying our framework to value the changes in mortality observed in the U.S. between 1965
and 1995, we show that altruism and fertility can double the estimated welfare gain of a young
adult. In relation to the aggregate social value, the increase is between 27% and 80%.
The paper also has implications for the evaluation of any other dimension of public policy that
may have long-lasting eﬀects (environmental policy, infrastructure development, technological im-
provements, etc.). The same principle used here to evaluate the welfare gain of future generations
c a na l s ob ea p p l i e di nt h e s eo t h e rc o n t e x t s .A l t r uism is a natural link between generations that
immediately brings together the welfare gains of all future cohorts. And, from the perspective of
the population currently alive, these gains are incorporated in a way that reﬂects precisely the
value that public policy should attribute to future populations.
Finally, our modelling of the way parents value the utility of children and their survival delivers
a series of results remarkably consistent with casual observations. For example, when deciding
over the custody of a baby, King Solomon−in the biblical example (1 Kings 3:16-28)−threatens to
split the live baby in half. When one woman accepts the compromise, but the other claims that
the baby does not belong to her (for the sake of her child’s life), King Solomon realizes that the
latter is the mother. Obviously, the loss of utility for the mother from a change between states
(child death) is much larger than the loss, conditional on the child being alive, from a transfer of
custody. Given the emotional loss associated with the child death, this would be true no matter
how miserable the life of the child could be (conditional on survival). Similarly, there are large
diﬀerences between lawsuit awards given for wrongful deaths of children and awards given for
wrongful births (due to contraceptive failures). Awards for wrongful births are low and mostly
based on the costs of raising a child, while awards for wrongful deaths are typically extremely
high, at values near our monetary measure of emotional loss (see Zelizer, 1994). This pattern
25supports the idea that the utility cost of losing an existing child is indeed very diﬀerent from the
marginal cost of acquiring an additional child (which is directly related to the marginal beneﬁto f
an additional child), even when replacement through additional births is possible.
In our calibrated model, child survival dominates any concern about welfare of children condi-
tional on survival. Therefore, our state-dependent formulation is entirely consistent with the views
expressed in the examples above. Also from this perspective, the theoretical setup suggested here
seems to be a promising benchmark for the incorporation of altruism and fertility−and therefore
future generations−in the evaluation of public policies.
A Appendix: Calibration of α, φ and Mc
Deﬁne the “value of a statistical life” as the willingness to pay for a one-shot unit reduction of
the probability of death at some speciﬁc age (as Murphy and Topel, 2003), without any similar
change for future generations. This deﬁnition is in line with the empirical interpretation of the
“value of a statistical life” and also with the data typically used to estimate this number. Suppose
that, for both adult and child mortalities, we are considering decisions when adults are about to
realize their fertility choices (age τ, which is closest from the perspective of the model to adults
that are raising children). From equations 9 and 10, the “values of a statistical life” for adults































With estimates of the “values of a statistical life” for adults and children, the expressions for
VSL A
τ and VSL C
τ above deﬁne a system of two non-linear equations on α, φ,a n dMc.F i r s to r d e r







VT+1 − Mc(1 − pc)
)
=( b + epc)uc(ct).
In a stationary environment, VT+1 can be substituted by the closed form solution for the
constant steady-state value function. Together with the two equations for VSL A
τ and VSL C
τ ,t h i s
expression deﬁnes a system of three non-linear equations on three unknowns (α, φ and Mc).
Blomquist, Miller, and Levy (1996), Mount et al. (2000), and Jenkins, Owens, and Wiggins
(2001) present estimates for VSL A
τ and VSL C
τ for the mid-1990’s (see Table 1). The other variables
26used in the calibration are set to their 1995 values. Additional parameters, functional forms, and
sources of variables used are discussed in the text. The solution to this problem for each diﬀerent
set of estimates of VSL A
τ and VSL C
τ generates the values of α, φ,a n dMc presented in Table 1.
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